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SCANDALOUS ORGANIZATIONAL 
CRISIS 
RONALD L. DUFRESNE* 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
When an organization finds itself mired in scandalous crisis, it is often 
impossible to see the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel—or to imagine 
that anything good can be realized once the organization emerges from that 
tunnel. Most organizations consider themselves lucky should they survive the 
crisis while retaining even a fraction of their reputation or public trust. 
Returning even to the status quo might be hailed as a feat of true organizational 
resilience. 
As organizational scholars in schools of management, we research 
organizational crisis and error from an organizational behavior perspective. 
Research on organizational crises and crisis management is a longstanding, 
cross-disciplinary tradition with roots in sociology, psychology, political science, 
communications, and public relations, among other fields. Here we employ an 
organizational perspective in considering how organizations can quell crises that 
have spread far beyond their organizational borders. In particular, we share a 
special interest in understanding how organizations can be “hyper-resilient” in 
the face of a crisis so that they are not just quickly returning to the status quo 
once the dust settles, but rather using the crisis as a springboard to becoming 
even better than before. In light of our interest in how organizations can 
transcend resilience, we explore here how organizations can turn the poison of 
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scandalous crisis into an opportunity for renewal and test the limits of our 
thinking in the context of the high-profile Duke lacrosse scandal. But first, what 
is meant by “organizational crisis,” and how does a high-profile scandal such as 
the one involving the Duke lacrosse players represent such a crisis? 
II 
HIGH-PROFILE SCANDAL AS A TYPE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS 
An “organizational crisis” begins as an organizational problem. One way of 
determining when it becomes a crisis is by considering what such incidences as 
product tampering, employee violence, or senior-management fraud have in 
common.1 Each of these events presents some form of threat to a central 
product or service line, an essential business unit, or the organization as a 
whole.2 Any event that threatens the well-being and safety of the organizational 
community, the community members outside of the organization, or the 
legitimacy of, or public trust in, an organization, can truly be called a crisis.3 
Further, organizational crises are events that hyperextend the organization’s 
resources and capacities and involve high-impact decisions that take it into 
uncharted waters.4 Even those organizations that have excellent problem-
solving skills find that they are threatened by the nature and complexity of the 
problems encountered in a crisis. 
Whereas all organizational crises share some basic features, high-profile 
scandals present special challenges. Such cases are notable in that they involve 
especially intensive media and public scrutiny of the events in question and of 
the individuals and organizations involved or implicated. It is indeed the public 
response that defines a scandal: “A transgression that became known to others 
but elicited no response from them would not give rise to a scandal, since 
scandal is shaped as much by the response of others as it is by the act of 
transgression itself.”5 Although scandals have long been mediated by 
technologies—dating back to broadsheet newspapers—in the age of Internet, 
anyone can jump into the public debate over such a scandalous organizational 
crisis, whether his or her views are based in fact or fantasy.  
Scandal is also distinct in that often the crisis is one of confidence or 
legitimacy; in the political or public arenas, the loss of legitimacy may be as 
much of a death knell as the public’s discovery of a manufacturer’s unsafe 
product.6 Organizations that are soothed by and develop crisis responses from 
 
 1. Christine M. Pearson et al., Managing the Unthinkable, 26 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, 
Autumn 1997, at 51, 51. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 51–52. 
 5. JOHN B. THOMPSON, POLITICAL SCANDAL: POWER AND VISIBILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE 20 
(2000). 
 6. Elizabeth A. Hamilton, An Exploration of the Relationship between Loss of Legitimacy and the 
Sudden Death of Organizations, 31 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 327 (2006). 
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the notion that public opinions are a misrepresentation of what really happened 
can be ambushed when they realize that the fuel for a scandal is not necessarily 
what is true, but what people believe to be true or want to believe is true. The 
fact is that scandal can result from and be fueled by a total distortion of reality. 
Scandals of this kind are also dissimilar to other forms of organizational 
crisis because they tend to become a stage upon which ongoing societal conflicts 
are acted out. For example, when Denny’s Corporation was accused of a 
longstanding pattern of discrimination against nonwhite customers, the 
accusations and ensuing legal battle spotlighted ongoing racial tensions in the 
United States.7 Many other corporate scandals of the recent past (for example, 
that involving Enron)8 are fueled by perceptions of corporate greed and a 
breach of ethical standards. Such scandals also spotlight mistreatment of 
“ordinary people” by the privileged class. 
[It is important to] separate out the two distinct realms of discourse that are operative 
in . . . scandal: the formal legal one, [and] the informal public one. Each realm has 
different standards of judgment, and plays a different role. The formal, legal realm is 
organized to determine the legal guilt or innocence of the individuals accused, while it 
should be clear that the public realm—that diffuse and loose amalgam of both formal 
and informal communications—cannot determine individual legal guilt or innocence.9 
The recognition of the two “realms of discourse” accompanying organizational 
scandal highlights particularly the ways in which the public realm must become 
a cultural site worthy of equal attention to the involved organizations.10 
Organizations must engage the legal and the public notions of accountability 
and responsibility, even if these notions seem irrational to a traditional business 
sensibility that is based only on truth and facts. 
In sum, these ideas suggest that organizations face particular challenges in 
managing events that trigger a public scandal. Any actions, decisions, or public 
statements (or lack thereof) made in the heat of the moment can quickly fuel 
the crisis to even more-extreme levels. First-order crises about the “facts” can 
quickly evolve into second-order crises about the reaction to the “facts.”11 
Further, organizations failing to realize that the scandal moves far beyond a set 
of legal facts or trusting that all will be vindicated when the real facts are 
revealed are likely to be missing the boat in their crisis response. Such scandals 
are the site where society is playing out its deepest problems and concerns 
about longstanding social ills: scandals involve deep human needs to identify 
“good” and “evil,” and to avenge bad behavior. 
 
 7. See generally JIM ADAMSON, THE DENNY’S STORY: HOW A COMPANY IN CRISIS 
RESURRECTED ITS GOOD NAME AND REPUTATION (2000). 
 8. Richard W. Stevenson, Why a Scandal Became a Spectacle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 4 
(Week in Review), at 1. 
 9. Linda Martin Alcott, Director of Women’s Studies at Syracuse University, Speech at the 
Inauguration of the Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media at Syracuse 
University (Sept. 19, 2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 24. 
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In the face of these challenges, most organizational leaders would simply be 
glad to emerge from the scandal with their organizations’ reputations relatively 
unscathed and with organizational and community members relatively 
unharmed. After tiresome damage control, the urge to “get back to business,” 
to get out of the limelight of media and public scrutiny, and to put the crisis 
behind the organization is likely to be quite strong for the organization’s leaders 
and members. To expect that the organization can actually use the crisis as a 
basis for renewal and rejuvenation may seem not only counterintuitive but also 
overly demanding after such trying experiences. The leadership of many 
organizations are simply relieved and fortunate to have returned to a state of 
normalcy, so efforts to use the crisis as a springboard for positive change are not 
even considered. Other leaders of other organizations intuit that there are 
powerful lessons embedded in the crisis, but their learning stops when they have 
determined how not to let that same bolt of lightning strike twice. This is in line 
with the oft-cited criticism that the U.S. Army is preparing to fight the previous 
war.12 
Is it really possible that an organization can use its experience with a high-
profile scandal as a springboard for renewal and positive change? The next 
section offers examples of some organizations that have faced crises and have 
benefited from the springboard. This ability to transform negative events into 
organizational transformation and renewal can be called “hyper-resilience”: 
such organizations achieve much more than simply bouncing back to the status 
quo (that is, resilience), but use their experiences to move to previously 
unrecognized levels of organizational effectiveness. The lacrosse scandal at 
Duke University illustrates the ways in which an organization can transform the 
trauma associated with scandal into an opportunity for positive organizational 
transformation. 
III 
THE LACROSSE SCANDAL: FROM CRISIS  
TO RENEWAL—OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE 
On a fateful night in March 2006, an exotic dancer arrived ready to perform 
at an alcohol-infused party held by the Duke lacrosse team.13 Who would have 
known that the dancer, hired by members of the team, would later accuse three 
players of raping her at the party and that these accusations would lead to a 
spiral of media frenzy and public scrutiny that would put Duke in the spotlight 
for months to come? The dancer was African American, had served in the U.S. 
military, was a student at the cross-town, historically black North Carolina 
Central University, and apparently was supporting herself through exotic 
 
 12. See, e.g., Thomas Vinciguerra, Waging Small Wars, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2004, 
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 7. 
 13. Susannah Meadows & Evan Thomas, What Happened at Duke?, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 2006, at 
40. 
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dancing.14 Although the three white male players publicly and steadfastly 
asserted their innocence, the county district attorney indicted the young men.15 
Following university protocols, Duke President Richard Brodhead placed the 
two students who had not yet graduated on interim suspension.16 President 
Brodhead also suspended the remaining games on the lacrosse schedule out of 
concern—at least in part—for the safety of the team members.17 In the months 
following the alleged incident, a firestorm of media and public interest swept 
around the case, in no small part because the case involved hot-button issues 
such as race, class, and gender.18 
In time, it became clear that there was no case for rape on that March night, 
resulting in the university’s offer to fully reinstate the accused players, as well as 
in the district attorney’s removal, disbarment, and conviction for criminal 
contempt of court for withholding evidence that would have exonerated all 
members of the Duke lacrosse team.19 In the wake of the scandalous crisis, 
President Brodhead formed five different committees on campus, each of which 
was charged with examining various aspects of Duke’s response to the scandal 
and uncovering underlying issues that may have contributed to the crisis.20 A 
close reading of the committees’ reports shows that Duke had an interest in, 
and the potential to learn from, its experiences.21 But is it really possible that 
Duke University could use this scandalous crisis as a springboard for 
organizational renewal and change? 
Organizational crises present (at least) six opportunities for crisis renewal 
and transformation that organizations can experience in the wake of 
unfortunate circumstances.22 These outcomes are (1) seeing stakeholder 
relationships in a new light, (2) reasserting or reshaping organizational mission 
and values, (3) recognizing vulnerabilities, (4) engaging in issue leadership, (5) 
 
 14. Samiha Khanna, Mother, Dancer, Accuser, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), April 16, 2006, 
at A1. 
 15. Benjamin Niolet et al., Lacrosse Players’ Lawyers Object, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), 
Mar. 30, 2006, at A1; Benjamin Niolet et al., Third Duke Player Indicted, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
NC), May 16, 2006, at A1. 
 16. Duke Office of News & Communication, Looking Back at the Duke Lacrosse Case (July 3, 
2007), available at http://news.duke.edu/lacrosseincident. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Meadows & Thomas, supra note 13. 
 19. Duke Office of News & Communication, supra note 16. 
 20. Id. 
 21. William G. Bowen & Julius L. Chambers, The Duke Administration’s Response to Lacrosse 
Allegations (May 4, 2006); James E. Coleman, Jr. et al., Report of the Lacrosse ad hoc Review 
Committee (May 1, 2006); Academic Council Student Affairs Committee, An Examination of Student 
Judicial Process and Practices (May 1, 2006); Campus Culture Initiative Steering Committee, Report of 
the Campus Culture Initiative Steering Committee (Feb. 15, 2007). 
 22. Judith A. Clair & Ronald L. Dufresne, Changing Poison into Medicine: How Companies can 
Experience Positive Transformation from a Crisis, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 63, 65 (2007) 
[hereinafter Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison]; Judith A. Clair & Ronald L. Dufresne, Phoenix 
Rising: Positive Consequences Arising from Organizational Crisis, in POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IN 
BUSINESS ETHICS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 143–64 (Robert A. Giacalone et al. eds., 
2005). 
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renovating underlying organizational structures, and (6) better understanding 
the wholeness of organizational life.23 Even organizations facing scandalous 
crises might find ways to transform the difficult circumstances of scandal into an 
opportunity for positive transformation, and the Duke scandal serves as a basis 
for exploration. Before moving forward, however, it is important to emphasize 
that none of these consequences is likely to be stumbled upon by luck. They are 
instead brought about by leaders—both formal and emergent—throughout the 
organization who seek through daily encounters to transform the world around 
them and who see crisis as an opportunity to continue doing so. 
A. Seeing Stakeholder Relationships in a New Light 
One way an organization can achieve hyper-resilience following a 
scandalous crisis is through heightened attention to stakeholder relationships. 
This may take the form of either recognizing one’s impact on a previously 
unrecognized stakeholder or realizing the importance of a formally minimized 
stakeholder. “Town–gown” issues invariably arise whenever large institutions 
like Duke exist within a relatively less-privileged community, and the issues are 
heightened even more when the majority of the students are from elsewhere 
and do not share demographic backgrounds (that is, are relatively more 
privileged—educationally, financially, and in other ways—than those in the 
surrounding community). The crisis that beset Duke University appears to have 
strengthened the recognition of the local civic community as a strategic partner. 
The lacrosse scandal not only revealed Duke’s close stakeholder relationship 
with its immediate campus neighbors, but also the university’s legal relationship 
with public authorities such as the Durham Police Department and the county 
and state prosecutors’ offices. With these new insights, Duke seemed to have an 
opportunity to strengthen its public image, to better respond to stakeholder 
concerns, and to transform its relationships with stakeholders. In fact, some of 
the committee reports relied specifically on reaching out to the community, 
neighborhoods, and organizations (such as the police) as a basis for building 
insights about vulnerabilities and opportunities for change. These reports offer 
evidence that the scandal itself paved the way to potentially stronger and more-
direct relations between Duke and its surrounding stakeholder community. 
B. Reasserted or Reshaped Organizational Mission and Values 
Hyper-resilience can also be seen when organizations emerging from crises 
recognize the need for and work to reassert or reshape organizational missions 
and values. Kierkegaard referred to this idea as “upbuilding,”24 which in this 
context entails using the organization’s self-image in the public domain as a 
 
 23. Cf. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 65. 
 24. Douglas Steele, Introduction to SOREN KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE (Douglas Steele 
trans., 1938) (1847). 
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motivator to remind itself of what it really wishes to be.25 In the aftermath of the 
alleged rape scandal, Duke was portrayed by some—including Rolling Stone—
to be a bacchanalian, elitist institution, and the lacrosse team to be a 
microcosmic depiction of this image.26 This portrayal may have contributed to 
President Brodhead’s naming of the Campus Culture Initiative Steering 
Committee, charged with studying the campus culture since the university 
recognized that, guilty or not, the players involved were embedded in a culture 
that may have contributed to underlying problems. The committee observed, 
[L]ast spring’s lacrosse event and its ensuing controversies evoked strong emotions 
and discussions about issues of race and gender, class and privilege, difference and 
respect, athletics and academics, and town and gown. While these social and cultural 
issues have long been of concern in our larger society and on Duke’s campus, these 
events publicly challenged Duke to closely re-examine itself to find more effective 
ways to enhance the sense of social responsibility and mutual respect among members 
of its community.27 
Brodhead called for the university to take the lead in reasserting and 
reshaping its own values around inclusion and diversity, and the committee 
identified ways to do so by, for example, addressing inherent, hierarchical social 
structures related to class, race, and gender within Duke’s community.28 This 
initiative seems to have had the potential to move beyond simply recovering by 
learning surface lessons; it instead sought deeper, long-lasting change. Whether 
this change is realized depends heavily on the organization’s ability to translate 
its new insights and good intentions into meaningful action. 
C. Recognizing Vulnerabilities 
Crisis can be invaluable in exposing organizational risks: 
A brush with crisis acts as a reality check. Crisis can not only reveal risks that leaders 
and other decision makers had so far not recognized, but also can temper out-of-
control or poorly monitored organizational behaviors and decisions. Just as the 
alcoholic hits rock bottom before giving up alcohol abuse, so too must some 
organizations experience a brush with major failure for leaders to be ready to change 
organizational behaviors for the better. . . . 
. . . 
. . . [A]n organizational crisis can also shake up inaccurate assumptions held by 
leaders, managers, and/or employees about what is occurring and why. This increased 
awareness can facilitate learning from crisis, if an organization is more ready to 
critically examine organizational blind spots and vulnerabilities. While it’s painful, 
managers and leaders would have probably never learned how to be more effective 
without the crisis experience.29 
 
 25. Richard P. Nielsen & Ron Dufresne, Can Ethical Organizational Character Be Stimulated and 
Enabled?: ‘‘Upbuilding’’ Dialog As Crisis Management Method, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 311, 312 (2005). 
 26. Janet Reitman, Sex & Scandal at Duke, ROLLING STONE, June 15, 2006, at 70. 
 27. Campus Culture Initiative Steering Committee, supra note 21, at 1. 
 28. Letter from Richard H. Brodhead, President, Duke University, to the Duke Community (April 
5, 2006). 
 29. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 67. 
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A previously unrecognized vulnerability evident in the wake of the Duke 
lacrosse scandal is the organization’s lack of control (relative to other kinds of 
organizations) over which organizational members make public statements—
and then, when and for what purpose. Beyond the effect of statements of 
individuals in the public domain, the crisis was inflamed by public statements 
made by faculty and students. The airing of disagreements among 
organizational members over the facts and implications of the scandal further 
exacerbated the crisis. It would be unusual in most corporate settings for 
organizational members to freely speak out in public about the circumstances of 
an event or issue facing the company, unless the member was an organizational 
leader or spokesperson, a whistleblower (protected—ostensibly—by federal 
law), or a former employee. Ironically, what would normally be considered a 
strength in any university—rich and public discourse around organizational and 
community issues—became a source of vulnerability for the university as 
individuals within the Duke community voiced their personal reactions to the 
case. The challenge for Duke under these circumstances was to recognize that 
this aspect of university life was both a vulnerability and a strength, to find ways 
to engage the inevitable debates in ways that would build its core strengths 
rather than undermine them, and to learn from such disagreements in a context 
of respectful and honest dialogue. 
D. Engaging in Issue Leadership 
In the crisis-management and crisis-communication communities, issue 
management refers to an organization’s developing a coherent set of talking 
points that will help the organization minimize long-term reputational damage.30 
Again, the goal of this approach is resilience. For a hyper-resilient outcome, 
however, some organizations move beyond issue management and instead 
engage in issue leadership. Issue leadership means that public crisis can afford 
an organization the opportunity to take a leadership role in engaging with a 
problem that similarly plagues other organizations. Others can therefore learn 
vicariously without suffering the personal costs of their own crisis. For example, 
in the medical field, highly publicized errors led Johns Hopkins to become an 
issue leader on patient safety and the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston 
to become an issue leader on avoiding medication errors.31 Given the public 
nature of issue leadership and the public airing of “dirty laundry” it entails, this 
form of hyper-resilience is not possible when an organization has a bunker 
mentality, as when legal action is pending. Since the issues at work in the Duke 
case—race and gender, openness and privacy, class and privilege, difference and 
 
 30. Kate Miller, Issues Management: The Link Between Organization Reality and Public 
Perception, PUB. REL. Q., Summer 1999, at 5. 
 31. Remaking American Medicine: The Silent Killer (PBS television broadcast Oct. 5, 2006); 
Richard A. Knox, Overdoses Still Weigh Heavy at Dana-Farber More Than Year After Tragedy, Cancer 
Institute Works to Balance Research Mission, Crucial Details of Patient Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 
1995, at A1. 
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respect, athletics and academics, town and gown—are faced by virtually every 
university in the country, there was a real opportunity for Duke to take a public 
leadership role on any or all of these issues. It would seem that Duke’s 
commitment to engage in conversations such as The Court of Public Opinion32 
indicated at least an attempt at exercising issue leadership. 
E. Renovation of Underlying Organizational Structures 
All organizations, especially organizations that have existed for some time, 
have deep-rooted structures in the form of reporting relationships, technologies, 
and physical structures such as office layout. These structures become deeply 
engrained approaches to organizational functioning because they are efficient 
or effective. Or perhaps they arose for idiosyncratic reasons but soon became 
taken-for-granted ways of functioning. Scholars who study organizational 
change recognize that such structures can make change difficult under normal 
circumstances.33 When change is on the horizon, people may resist because they 
fear that they will lose the efficiencies associated with “the ways we’ve always 
done things.” Often, people rely on the ways that things were always done 
rather than on new practices because they lack the time, energy, or will to make 
changes. For example, despite the shifting technological landscape around it, 
Eastman Kodak long clung onto its identity as a photographic film company, 
thereby becoming a late entrant into the digital imaging market.34 
Organizational crises, however, offer an impetus, a necessity, and an 
opportunity to change deeply engrained structures in ways that would not have 
been possible otherwise. In the most extreme cases, crises result in the literal 
destruction of organizational structures, as in organizations demolished in the 
events of 9/11.35 In such cases, the crisis, while tragic in losses and costs incurred, 
offers new and fresh opportunities to build organizational structures from the 
ground up. Although in some ways it would be comforting to rebuild the 
structures to replicate their precrisis form, the crisis brings the possibility for a 
hyper-resilient response that reimagines what structures might be more 
effective. Such was the hyper-resilient response by investment bank Sandler 
O’Neill + Partners to its near-destruction on 9/11.36 The company not only 
reconstructed its physical and electronic infrastructure, it sought new lines of 
business and committed itself to caring for employee and family well-being—
not just profitability.37 
 
 32. Duke University School of Law, The Court of Public Opinion: The Practice and Ethics of 
Trying Cases in the Media (Sept. 28–29, 2007). 
 33. Cf. KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951). 
 34. James Bandler, Kodak Shifts Focus from Film, Betting Future on Digital Lines, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 25, 2003, at A1. 
 35. Cf. Steven F. Freeman, Larry Hirschhorn, & Marc Maltz, The Power of Moral Purpose: Sandler 
O’Neill & Partners in the Aftermath of September 11th, 2001, ORG. DEVELOPMENT J., Winter 2004, at 
69. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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In crises such as a scandal, the limits of entrenched structures may be 
exposed to the organization, and its impetus for creating change can be stronger 
than previously. For example, in the Duke lacrosse case, it is evident that the 
“silo” approach to organizational structure, wherein each department tends to 
see issues through its limited departmental perspective, obstructed vital 
communications within Duke, and slowed down top administrators’ awareness 
of critical information and the organization’s response to the scandal.38 The 
scandal further exposed the problems that can arise when there is a separation 
between the athletic and the academic sides of the organization, and 
underscored the need for an integrative community. Although organizations 
experiencing scandal (and not the physical destruction of organizational 
structures) do not have the opportunity to literally build new structures from 
the ground up, the scandal does provide legitimization and an urge for change 
that may not have existed previously. Organizational members who may have 
resisted change in the past may be more aware of the need for and more open 
to making changes. 
F. Enhanced Understanding of the Wholeness of Organizational Life 
Organizations frequently function as if there is organizational life and 
nonorganizational life, and never the two shall meet. To illustrate, many 
organizations assume that emotions have no place at work, and that employees 
will be most effective if they leave their emotional lives at home.39 However, 
organizational crises—which frequently involve death, destruction, failure, and 
other ills—highlight that emotions need to be recognized as part of 
organizational life and that failure to appreciate the emotional aspects of work-
life, especially in a crisis, can actually fuel the flames of a crisis. Further, positive 
emotions—such as passion and compassion—can improve rather than diminish 
organizational effectiveness.40 Organizations that have experienced a crisis may 
be better able to recognize passionate and compassionate feelings of 
organizational members and stakeholders, and to tap into those feelings as a 
source of renewal. 
For example, while painful and hurtful, one thing the Duke scandal exposed 
was the diverse and strong feelings within the Duke community about issues of 
race, class, and gender.41 The scandal at Duke provided a bird’s eye view of 
these differences, and while the sting of disagreements may still have been 
evident in the university community, leaders at all levels of the university had 
an opportunity to recognize the diversity of emotions and personal experience 
within that community and to tap into the strength of feeling as a motivating 
 
 38. Bowen & Chambers, Duke Administration’s Response, supra note 21, at 14. 
 39. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 69. 
 40. Jane E. Dutton, Monica C. Worline, Peter J. Frost, & Jacoba Lilius, Explaining Compassion 
Organizing, 51 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 59 (2006). 
 41. Anne Blythe & Jane Stancill, Frustrations Boil at Duke, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), 
Mar. 28, 2006, at A9. 
10__DUFRESNE & CLAIR__CONTRACT PROOF.DOC 11/18/2008  11:44:26 AM 
Autumn 2008] MOVING BEYOND MEDIA FEAST AND FRENZY 211 
force to create positive change. To undertake change within a contentious 
environment, such as one involving scandal, would entail great skill at managing 
emotions at all levels of the organization. 
As a second illustration, organizations frequently fail to appreciate that the 
ills and strengths of their communities are also likely to be evident within the 
context of the organizations themselves. For example, regarding diversity and 
inclusion, many organizations assume that racial, ethnic, religious, class, or 
gender strife is not present in their organization, or has been well-managed. 
Although the organization may have tried to effectively manage its diverse 
workforce, the organization itself may be embedded in a local community or, 
more broadly, a geographic area where such issues are prevalent and 
unresolved. A brush with scandal of the kind experienced by Duke University 
highlights how the organization is interrelated with its broader community. This 
makes evident that Duke must both encourage a more diverse and inclusive 
environment within its own walls as well as be a force for change within the 
civic community as a whole. 
There is some evidence, based on President Brodhead’s public statements 
and the committees’ reports, that the lacrosse scandal crystallized the 
inequalities within Duke’s own community and the community at large and 
indicated that leadership for change was needed within and outside of the Duke 
University community.42 Duke has a real opportunity—one that may not have 
been recognized or fully appreciated in the past—to break down the false 
barriers between, and embrace the wholeness of life within, diverse 
communities. 
IV 
NEXT STEPS TO CREATING POSITIVE  
TRANSFORMATION: BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Seeking positive transformation or hyper-resilience in the midst of a 
scandalous crisis is in many ways about managing tensions. There is tension 
between the motivation to get on with the organization’s life and the motivation 
to ask the deeper—and more painful—questions that may crystallize the 
broader lessons to be learned. There is tension between leaders presenting 
themselves as competent and confident and their being, in fact, humble, 
uncertain, and vulnerable. There is tension between knowing what really 
happened and recognizing what others think really happened. There is also the 
ongoing tension between attending to the day-to-day challenges and duties of 
running the organization and attending to the practices and commitments that 
can ward off crisis or enable a hyper-resilient response. 
The management of these tensions is by no means an easy exercise. It is the 
exceptionally rare organization that can mindfully realize even one of the 
 
 42. Committee Reports, supra note 21; Brodhead Letter, supra note 28. 
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aspects of hyper-resilience discussed above. One reason for this is the incredible 
time pressure organizations and their leaders face during a scandalous crisis. In 
the for-profit business world, time horizons have been compressed from the 
long-term down to quarterly earnings reports and further down to daily—and 
even minute-by-minute—share prices.43 Even minor issues that affect share 
price negatively can merit extensive coverage on 24-hour news channels such as 
CNBC. Today, businesses, governments, universities, and any other 
organization imaginable exist in a world where news needs to be generated and 
covered around-the-clock and where nameless bloggers can inform and 
misinform millions with a keystroke. Organizations, then, feel great pressure to 
act decisively, and successful problem-solving may still leave the deeper issues 
unexamined. When dozens of news trucks lined up on Duke’s campus, it was 
undoubtedly even more challenging to think imaginatively, openly, and 
reflectively about how the entire community might grow through the public 
scandal. 
Another reason why hyper-resilience is so difficult to achieve is because of 
the competing interests of organizational stakeholders. There can be wildly 
varying views about what response an organization should pursue, depending 
on if one is asking—in the classic business example—owners, managers, 
employees, customers (past, present, and future), suppliers, neighbors, 
regulators, competitors, et cetera. The most salient stakeholder tends to be the 
one with the loudest voice, and often that voice can argue for a quick return to 
the status quo. The problem of competing interests is exacerbated in more-
organic organizations like universities where it may be impossible for 
administrators, faculty, staff, and students to agree on what the crisis is about or 
even that there is a crisis in the first place. For example, while the Duke lacrosse 
case seemed to gain national traction as a scandalous crisis involving issues of 
race, class, and gender, some members of the Duke community framed the 
issues instead in terms of higher-education institutions’ role as advocates for 
civil liberties.44 
There are often multiple orders of crisis or scandal45—and this appears true 
in the Duke lacrosse scandal as well. On the first order, the crisis may have been 
about what did or did not happen in that house on the night of the lacrosse 
party. Framed in these terms, it appears that the first-order crisis was one of 
“out-of-control,” privileged student-athletes. On the second order, the crisis 
may have been about how Duke and its community responded to the 
allegations of the first order. Here, the crisis may have been about any number 
of things: a rush to judgment by civic and university authorities, academic 
freedom of faculty to advocate their perspective, due process for the accused 
 
 43. The McKinsey Global Survey of Business Executives: Business and Society, MCKINSEY Q., July, 
2006, at 33. 
 44. STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS 
AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007). 
 45. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 24. 
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and for the nonaccused lacrosse players and coaches, “trial” in the court of 
public opinion, and concern for public safety. Depending on one’s perspective, 
the second-order crisis could have been about any, all, or none of these issues. 
Even more confounding in this case was that, as the public eventually learned, 
there was no legal case underlying the first-order crisis. One political scientist’s 
model of scandal assumes that something untoward does in fact happen to 
trigger the cascade of obfuscation, leaking, and reacting that constitutes the first 
days of scandal.46 Yet when nothing (legally) untoward happens initially, scandal 
can still explode. How then, in this fractured domain, might an organization 
possibly focus on anything other than mere survival? 
V 
CONCLUSION 
One of the enduring insights from the research on organizational crisis 
management is that effective crisis management begins long before crisis 
strikes. It follows that the management of tensions inherent in seeking hyper-
resilience following a scandal must also begin long before the scandal erupts. 
This is not to say that every possible scandal or crisis be scripted with a 
playbook. Rather, organizations need to engage in practices and habits that will 
increase their chances of realizing hyper-resilient outcomes when the time 
comes. Three such disciplines are a commitment to personal transformation, a 
commitment to interpersonal engagement, and a commitment to experimenting 
with learning structures.47 Taken together, if these disciplines were adopted 
seriously throughout an organization, the likelihood of hyper-resilience would 
be greatly enhanced. 
The idea behind developing a commitment to personal transformation is the 
need for leaders to develop a more post-conventional worldview in which 
paradox and tension are welcomed, not shunned. A post-conventional 
worldview recognizes that perception and reality can and do differ, and that 
reasonable people can draw radically different conclusions based on seemingly 
identical stimuli. A commitment to interpersonal engagement is about seeing 
organizations as human systems and human—not technological—
accomplishments. This discipline entails being curious and engaging in dialogue 
with others to uncover their assumptions and blind spots. Last, a commitment 
to experimenting with learning structures challenges organizations to find ways 
to learn collectively from relatively minor failures—both potentially to avoid 
larger failures and to have the means to learn from larger failures. Learning 
structures can be after-action reviews or other techniques to ensure collective 
reflectivity and to encourage everyone in the organization to take ownership of 
the learning process. It should be apparent that these three disciplines are 
cumulative. It is impossible to take interpersonal engagement seriously without 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 72. 
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caring about personal transformation, and learning structures will fail without 
commitment to learning from each other. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why hyper-resilience following organizational 
crisis is so rare is that organizations and leaders that commit to these disciplines 
are exceptionally rare. At its heart, this rarity highlights the deep tension 
between our assumptions that leaders should be decisively heroic and the need 
for leaders to be vulnerably open. In the final analysis, while organic 
organizations such as universities may be susceptible to difficulties in managing 
crises or scandals due to their fractured natures, such organizations may prove 
to be the best training grounds for the type of organizational leadership that is 
open and curious for multiple perspectives. As such, they may provide the best 
hope for realizing hyper-resilience in the face of scandalous crisis. 
